



Security Council

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17 December 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

LETTER DATED 16 DECEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
PANAMA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the letter addressed to the Chairman of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries concerning the situation in Yugoslavia.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) César PEREIRA BURGOS
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 16 December 1991 from the Permanent Representative
of Panama to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of
the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries

In my capacity as Permanent Representative of Panama to the United Nations, I acknowledge receipt of document S/23289 concerning your letter of 13 December 1991 to the Security Council, which you wrote in your capacity as Chairman of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries.

During the meeting on Friday, 13 December, our delegation requested the floor in order to place on record the position of our Government concerning the statement you proposed. We were not given the floor because many countries had participated, and this fact compels me to send this clarification, with a request that it be circulated among the representatives of the non-aligned countries in New York.

Having maintained splendid relations for many years, the Government of Panama has viewed with concern the development of the situation in Yugoslavia. Without apportioning responsibility for the tragic situation that now exists, we wish to place on record our solidarity with the Yugoslav people and its various ethnic groups.

The nationalities issue has been a complicated element of modern States, and this applies not only to Europe. On the contrary, the potential for such conflict exists in Africa, Asia and America. Specific solutions are conditional, inter alia, on the handling of internal tensions in such a way as to ensure that the principle of self-determination of peoples is applied as humanity expects it to be applied.

My Government is confident that a peaceful solution will be found to the conflict that now ravages your country, but it cannot lay the responsibility on the minorities which are seeking autonomy, nor can it commit itself to supporting the document which was adopted without our participation or support.



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17 December 1991

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Security Council, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 699 (1991), the attached first semi-annual report on the implementation by the IAEA of the plan for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of items listed in paragraph 12 of United Nations Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

Annex

Letter dated 5 December 1991 from the Director General
of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to
the Secretary-General

United Nations Security Council resolution 699 (1991) approved on 17 June 1991, requests, inter alia, the Secretary-General to submit to the Security Council progress reports on the implementation of the plan for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of the items specified in paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991). Such reports are to be submitted every six months after the adoption of the resolution and the first report is therefore due on 17 December 1991.

Please find attached an outline of the activities carried out by the Agency during the past six months under the plan for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, that you might find useful for the preparation of your report.

(Signed) Hans BLIX

Enclosure

**First semi-annual report (covering the period 17 June - 17 December 1991)
on the implementation by the IAEA of the plan for the destruction,
removal or rendering harmless of items listed in paragraph 12
of UN Security Council resolution 687 (1991)**

Introduction

Security Council resolution 699 of 17 June 1991 approved the plan submitted by the IAEA through the Secretary-General for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of all items listed in paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 687. Resolution 699 at the same time called for a report to be submitted every six months on progress in implementing the plan. This is the first such report.

At the time the plan was drawn up, the first on-site inspection under the terms of resolution 687 had just started. The objectives of that inspection were based on the declarations made by the Government of Iraq on 18 and 27 April 1991. The plan took into account the material and facilities known to exist at the time, but stressed that inspections would have to determine whether items additional to those declared by Iraq existed. As subsequent inspections have shown, the Iraqi nuclear program was far more extensive than what was indicated by the declarations of 18 and 27 April 1991 - and the full extent of the program may not even now be known. This report therefore covers not only the items known at the time of submission of the IAEA plan but also items revealed subsequently.

Throughout this period, Iraq's persistent practice of only limited acknowledgement of activities exposed through inspections, its concealment of evidence in such critical areas as uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons development, its denial of unrestricted access to certain sites, its detaining of the Agency's team on one occasion and its confiscating of documents from inspectors have made it rather difficult for the Agency to discharge its duties.

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Original Prime Concern

The original prime concern related to the nuclear material known to be in Iraq in a readily nuclear-weapons-usable form (in Agency practice, such material is referred to as "direct-use" material, "directly usable" meaning that no further enrichment or irradiation in a reactor is necessary). Of this material, the most important as regards ease of handling and hence use in weapons production consisted of the stocks of fresh (unirradiated) fuel for the IRT 5000 reactor. These consisted of 68 fuel assemblies of 80% enrichment with a U235 content of 10.97 kilograms and 10 assemblies of 36% enrichment with a U235 content of 1.27 kilograms. In addition, there was a set of fresh fuel plates for the Tamuz-2 reactor (French MTR type) with an enrichment of 93% and a total U235 content of 372 grams.

Other highly enriched material containing a total of 35.58 kg of U235 had been irradiated and so, owing to its radioactivity, could not be readily utilized in weapons production. Nevertheless, the degree of enrichment, up to 93%, meant that this material also had to be considered of high strategic value. The first IAEA inspection team found that the irradiated material was held at two storage locations. One was the fuel pond, which contained both the reactor core and fuel storage racks (and near which was a small subsidiary storage pool); the other was an emergency storage to which the fuel from the Tamuz-2 reactor core and associated pond had been transferred during the bombing campaign. This emergency storage, designated "location B", consisted of pits in a farmland area a few miles from the Tuwaittha Nuclear Centre.

Present Situation

Direct-Use Material

All the fresh fuel for the IRT 5000 reactor, both 80% and 36% enriched, was removed from Iraq on 15 and 17 November 1991. Removal of the strategically most significant material marks

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an important stage in the implementation of the IAEA plan. 400 grams of unirradiated high-enriched uranium now remains in Iraq. This will be removed soon if current contract negotiations are successful.

The irradiated fuel presented severe problems regarding preparation for safe transport. The fuel at location B is stored under conditions which would be completely unacceptable by normal standards. Radiation levels are high and owing to the lack of water treatment and suitable containing material, corrosion problems cannot be avoided. The pond at the IRT 5000 reactor site was filled with debris when the reactor was destroyed. Careful work was necessary in order to clear the pond and improve conditions sufficiently to verify the fuel without creating an area contamination hazard. This has now been done and plans to prepare the fuel for lifting and transport are being worked out. All fuel elements in location B are presently under the Agency seals.

Initially, no fuel handling organization was willing to enter into a contract for removal of the fuel from Iraq. Later, a consortium of leading transport and reprocessing organizations from two States expressed a willingness to enter into a commercial arrangement, and contract negotiations have been under way for several months. It is hoped that these will be completed shortly. The financial sums involved are large and many legal and safety problems are having to be solved before the parties can conclude a contract. During this period the fuel has been regularly inspected by the IAEA inspection teams.

Plutonium

A total of 6 grams of clandestinely produced plutonium was eventually declared by Iraq. This material was removed from Iraq during the 5th IAEA inspection.

Other Nuclear Material

Since the declarations of 18 and 27 April inspections have resulted in some 400 tons of additional material being declared by Iraq - natural uranium in many forms, ranging from yellowcake to processed chemicals. Although not directly weapons-usable material, it falls within the scope of Security Council resolution 707. Much of the material had been concealed by dispersion or burial in desert areas. As a result, it took time to recover and assemble all this material at a site where identification and verification could take place. The technical activities involved in verifying the material have now been completed and the material is under seal.

Equipment

The IAEA plan stated that priority would be given to the identification of research, development, support and manufacturing facilities and materials relevant or connected to irradiated fuel reprocessing and isotopic enrichment. The extent of the facilities and equipment revealed has been reported after each inspection and will therefore only be summarized here. The major discovery has been that of the Electromagnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS) program and its extent. A major concealment effort was made by Iraq to hide the existence of its program from inspectors, equipment being dispersed and in many cases buried in remote areas. As far as can be established in these circumstances, the EMIS equipment has now been largely accounted for. The remaining parts have been collected at one site and destruction has been proceeding steadily during recent inspections. Destruction involves cutting the magnet pole pieces (with special plasma torches), the vacuum chambers and associated equipment. A total of eight large magnet poles have been destroyed to date and all the vacuum chambers.

In addition to the EMIS program, a centrifuge program was under way. The equipment for this has also been systematically destroyed or removed. In particular, some rotor and bearing parts have been removed for examination, to establish the extent and nature of the program, while most of the centrifuge components have been crushed. Special machines used to produce the centrifuges have been destroyed or rendered useless by the cutting of key parts.

Weaponization

Recent inspections have concentrated on the nuclear weaponization program - i.e. warhead development and assembly as distinct from nuclear material production. The seventh and eighth inspections revealed special equipment essential to such a program. Two special video cameras ("streak cameras") have been removed from Iraq and other equipment has been sealed pending decision on removal, destruction or monitoring.

Hot Cells

The Tuwaittha Nuclear Centre was extensively equipped with "hot cells" for dealing with radioactive material. Many of these were severely damaged in the bombing, but concern remained about their possible reconstruction and about the possible use of the undamaged cells. During the seventh inspection, these cells were rendered harmless by the cutting of manipulator arms and control wires. Associated glove boxes were rendered useless by having cement poured into them. As a long-term measure, epoxy resin is being used in addition to cement to render harmless the mixers-settlers.

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Buildings

To date no buildings have been destroyed by inspection teams. Most buildings used in the clandestine programs were destroyed by bombing. The Iraqi authorities themselves have expressed a desire to demolish many buildings at Tuwaitha so that the sites may be re-used for non-prohibited nuclear activities or for non-nuclear activities. The sites of Buildings B50, B80 and B85, which were destroyed by bombing, have already been completely cleared.

Future Activities

The removal from Iraq of the remaining 35 kilograms of U235 contained in the irradiated fuel elements of the Tamuz-2 and IRT 5000 research reactors is one of the major tasks still pending. Negotiations with contractors are in progress, and preliminary work to facilitate the extraction of the fuel elements from the damaged reactor building is terminated.

Destruction of the EMIS components will be completed; other key equipment relevant to nuclear weapons development research and to centrifuge manufacturing which is now under Agency seals will be rendered useless or removed.

It is expected that the analysis of samples taken at Al Atheer will indicate which equipment/building still need to be destroyed.

Vienna, 5 December 1991

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Summary

The present situation regarding destruction, removal or rendering harmless can be summarized as follows:-

Directly usable material (High Enriched Uranium)

68 fuel assemblies 80% enriched - removed

10 fuel assemblies 36% enriched - removed

(Remaining - 372 grams of U235 in 93%-enriched uranium contained in MTR-type fuel plates)

Plutonium

6 grams - removed

Natural uranium

Approximately 400 tons - stored under IAEA seal

EMIS equipment

Magnet poles - 8 destroyed

Vacuum chambers - all destroyed

Coils - all destroyed

Centrifuge equipment

Centrifuges - destroyed (some specimens removed to IAEA)

Manufacturing equipment - key components destroyed

Hot Cells

- rendered harmless



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LETTER DATED 19 DECEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you the text of the Special Announcement on a Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, which was made on 18 December 1991 by His Excellency Roh Tae Woo, President of the Republic of Korea.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Chang Hee ROE
Ambassador

Annex

Special Announcement on a Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula

Last week, South and North Korea agreed on a detailed accord in an effort to end the half-century-old cold war on the Korean peninsula and to open a new era of peace.

The accord, which was signed at the conclusion of the fifth South-North high-level talks, consists of important measures that are necessary to end national division and rivalry on the basis of mutual trust, to build a structure of peace on our land and to promote national reconciliation and common prosperity through exchanges and cooperation.

The Republic of Korea fully supports this accord, for we believe that the development of an inter-Korean relationship based on peaceful coexistence and common prosperity is an essential step towards the goal of national unification.

Together with the parallel entry of South and North Korea into the United Nations in September, the signing of the South-North Korean accord last week is an epic milepost on our road to the resolution of the Korean question and the attainment of national unity.

South and North Korea should now march together towards peace and unification.

The tasks and courses of action which lie ahead of the two Koreas are clear.

It is now incumbent on the two Korean Governments to implement faithfully the contents of the accord step by step so that national reconciliation, peace and common prosperity, which are aspirations shared by all Koreans, may be soon realized.

The Republic of Korea pledges to do its utmost in transforming the relationship with the North from one of rivalry to partnership, exchanges and cooperation. In addition, we will seek a speedy resolution of political and military issues between South and North Korea.

The cold war brought upon our nation untold sorrows and tragedies. The sacrifices and tribulations this nation suffered from division, war and rivalry have been truly enormous and unbearable.

Now, the two Koreas have produced a charter of peace that will end a dark period in their history and bring forth a new era of reconciliation and cooperation. I firmly believe that this new charter will mark a momentous turning-point on the road to building a new nation in which 70 million Koreans together will forge a glorious future.

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Before we proceed with the implementation of the widely supported inter-Korean accord, however, there is an important issue that must be resolved at the earliest possible date. It is the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula.

On 8 November, I enunciated the non-nuclear Korean peninsula peace initiative, noting that the development of nuclear weapons by North Korea was an extremely dangerous venture which posed serious threats not only to the peace and survival of the Korean people, but also to regional and global stability.

It was for these reasons that I made a public pledge specifically declaring that South Korea would not manufacture, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons and that we would also renounce the right to build nuclear reprocessing facilities, which could very well have been justified on grounds of economic necessity.

In order to remove any obstacles to nuclear inspections of North Korea, my Government, in consultation with the United States Government, has proposed during the recent high-level talks to conduct simultaneous nuclear inspections of facilities in the South, including United States military bases in South Korea.

To submit military bases of a nuclear super-Power to international inspection is a truly exceptional precedent, but we have reached this decision for the sole purpose of a peaceful and smooth resolution of the Korean peninsula nuclear issue.

It is gratifying to note that last week at the high-level talks, South and North Korea jointly recognized that there should be no nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula. On this common ground, I sincerely hope that a definitive agreement on nuclear issues will emerge from the Panmunjom working-level conference later this month.

So that we may come to an early resolution of the nuclear issue, I take this opportunity to make one thing emphatically and unequivocally clear to you, my fellow Koreans, as well as to North Korea and the world at large.

As I speak, there do not exist any nuclear weapons whatsoever, anywhere in the Republic of Korea.

Clearly, then, the non-nuclear policy enunciated in my 8 November declaration has now been fulfilled in so far as the Republic of Korea is concerned.

I would like to emphasize the following to the North Korean authorities.

Since the Republic of Korea is now completely nuclear-free and since we have agreed to the simultaneous nuclear inspections proposal, there is no reason or excuse for North Korea to develop nuclear weapons or refuse nuclear inspection.

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North Korea must forthwith conclude and ratify a nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, shut down all nuclear reprocessing and enrichment facilities, and submit unconditionally to international inspection.

It is now North Korea's responsibility to demonstrate to the Korean people and the world that a genuine peace is indeed emerging on the Korean peninsula, by resolving the nuclear issue on the basis of the letter and spirit of the South-North accord.

Obviously, we cannot successfully build peace and national reconciliation without first resolving the nuclear question. For this reason, the entire international community is currently searching for ways to deter North Korea's development of nuclear weapons, having recognized them to be a significant threat to the peace of this region and potentially a grave danger in fuelling the proliferation of nuclear weapons globally.

I believe that the North Korean authorities are well aware of the central issues. I would expect that North Korea will bring to the forthcoming Panmunjom conference measures that will satisfy the legitimate demands of the Korean people and the international community.

North Korea must immediately abandon the development of nuclear weapons. It is an imperative duty that cannot and should not be delayed.

I sincerely hope that an agreement guaranteeing a nuclear-free Korean peninsula will emerge by the end of this month so that, with the new year, the two Koreas will usher in a new era of reconciliation, cooperation, peace and common prosperity.



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LETTER DATED 19 DECEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 19 December 1991 from Mr. Ahmad Hussein, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning a report published in The New York Times of 11 December 1991 on the persistence of the United States Administration in its policy of interfering in the affairs of Iraq.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 19 December 1991 from the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to bring to your attention a number of excerpts from a report by Patrick E. Tyler published in The New York Times of 11 December 1991:

"The military options, prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff over the last three weeks, would prepare the United States for a situation in which key officers in Iraq's armed forces might request support from Washington in an attempt to seize power from President Saddam Hussein.

"The options are to be reviewed on Thursday at a high-level meeting of the so-called deputies committee of key Cabinet departments, which is headed by Adm. Jonathan T. Howe, the deputy national security adviser.

"...

"The military options were provided by Gen. Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President's top military adviser. They were reviewed by Defense Secretary Dick Cheney before being sent to the White House late last week.

"...

"The White House wants a military solution based only on air forces and naval forces, officials said, while General Powell is said to believe strongly that the removal of Mr. Hussein cannot be guaranteed under any coup scenario without committing American ground troops, ...

"...

"The military review was conducted in response to two specific scenarios posed by the National Security Council staff, officials said. Under one scenario, Iraqi military commanders began a coup attempt that bogged down and then asked for American assistance. Under a second scenario, Iraqi military leaders signaled to Washington they were ready to depose Mr. Hussein if the United States would provide support, particularly air support, since the Iraqi Air Force remains grounded ..."

I further have the honour to refer you to my letter of 14 October 1991 concerning the statement made by the President of the United States at a press conference on 4 October, when he said: "I should like to see Saddam Hussein out of power so that we can normalize our relations with the Iraqi people. This has been my policy all along, and his removal is in the interest of the United States ...". What is clear is that the policy of the President of the United States has entered a stage of actual implementation and of preparation for the use of armed force against Iraq.

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Such are the malicious, noxious and perverse designs of United States policy and such the manoeuvres and statements that evince malicious and noxious intentions. They are incompatible with the basic purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and in particular with its Article 2, paragraph 4, which states that "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other matter inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

The measures now being taken and the scenarios being considered in the corridors of the United States Administration, as revealed by the report, are indicative both of preparations for the use of armed force against Iraq and of incitement of members of the Iraqi armed forces to revolt against the existing authority. This is inconsistent with the rules of international law and custom to say nothing of the fact that it constitutes an abrupt departure from the proper mode of interaction between States.

We nevertheless have confidence in our people and our armed forces and in their patriotism and fair-mindedness, and our intention in all the references we have made has been to state with conviction that the United States Administration is persisting in its policy of interfering in Iraq's affairs in a manner that is at variance with its obligation, as a permanent member of the Security Council, to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign State and founding member of the United Nations and from threatening its security, its territorial integrity, its independence and the political choices made by its people.

Silence in the face of such perverse policies and of a dualistic interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations and of international legitimacy on the part of the United States of America will have dire consequences for the United Nations and for the future of peoples which have made sacrifices for their independence, freedom and dignity.

The Government of the Republic of Iraq calls upon you to meet your responsibility in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law by refusing to accept the designs of the United States Administration against the Iraqi people and its national Government and by bringing an end to its persistence in interfering in Iraq's internal affairs and in implementing its infamous policy.

I should like to request that this letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ahmad HUSSEIN
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Iraq



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19 December 1991
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ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 19 DECEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I should like to inform you that the United States Air Force is persisting in its violations of Iraqi airspace, as set forth hereunder.

11/12 December 1991

Seven sorties, flown by one two-aircraft formation and five single aircraft at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 5,000 to 6,000 metres, centring over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall'afar and Amadiyah.

12/13 December 1991

Twenty sorties, flown by 10 two-aircraft formations at speeds of 680 to 950 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 4,000 to 7,500 metres, centring over Irbil, Dohuk, Mosul, Zakho and Amadiyah.

13/14 December 1991

Twenty-four sorties, flown by 12 two-aircraft formations at speeds of 600 to 950 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 2,500 to 7,000 metres, centring over Mosul, Zakho, Dohuk, Ayn Zalah, Tall'afar, Sanjar and Amadiyah.

14/15 December 1991

Fifteen sorties, flown by seven two-aircraft formations and one single aircraft at a speed of 720 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 4,000 to 5,000 metres, centring over Mosul, Tall'afar, Dohuk and Irbil.

At 1225 hours, two F-111s overflew Faruq airfield.

16/17 December 1991

Twenty-five sorties, flown by 12 two-aircraft formations and one single aircraft at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 2,000 to 20,000 metres, centring over Zakho, Dohuk, Ayn Zalah, Mosul, Tall'afar, Irbil and Rawanduz.

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At 0825 and at 1103 hours, two formations of two F-16s each overflew Faruq airfield at a speed of 650 to 700 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 800 to 1,000 metres.

At 0955 and 1005 hours, two formations of two Jaguars each overflew Faruq and Firnas airfields at a speed of 800 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 50 to 100 metres.

At 1250 and 1300 hours, two Tornados overflew Faruq airfield at a speed of 650 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 50 metres.

17/18 December 1991

Twenty-two sorties, flown by 11 two-aircraft formations at speeds of 750 to 950 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 1,500 to 5,000 metres, centring over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall'afar and Ayn Zalah.

At 0805 and 1245 hours, two F-16s overflew Faruq airfield at a speed of 650 to 700 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 200 metres.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



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19 December 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE
SITUATION CONCERNING WESTERN SAHARA

1. The present report is submitted in accordance with Security Council resolution 690 (1991), by paragraph 6 of which the Council requested the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed of the implementation of his settlement plan for Western Sahara. This opportunity to share with the Council my assessment of the situation is all the more welcome as I near the end of my term of office as Secretary-General.

2. It may be useful to recall the main elements of the United Nations plan as described in paragraph 47 of my report of 18 June 1990. 1/ The plan provides for a transitional period during which the United Nations will organize and conduct a referendum in the Territory to enable the people of Western Sahara to choose between independence or integration with Morocco. To this end, there is to be a cease-fire, which will mark the beginning of the transitional period, a reduction in the number of Moroccan troops in the Territory and confinement of the combatants of both sides to locations designated by my Special Representative. In order to ensure that the necessary conditions exist for the holding of a free and fair referendum, the United Nations will monitor the administration of the Territory and will ensure that any laws or regulations that might impede the holding of a free and fair referendum will be suspended as necessary. Finally, all refugees and other Western Saharans living outside the Territory who wish to return will be enabled to do so by the United Nations after their right to vote has been established.

3. On 24 May 1991, in accordance with the plan, I proposed that the cease-fire should enter into effect on 6 September 1991. Both parties accepted that date. 2/ During the following three months, it became clear that it would not be possible to complete before 6 September 1991 a number of tasks that were supposed to be completed before the cease-fire came into effect. It also became clear that, notwithstanding the parties' earlier acceptance of the plan, substantial areas of difference remained. In these circumstances one party was not able to agree that the transition period should begin on 6 September 1991, as envisaged in the plan.

4. Meanwhile, hostilities had broken out in the Territory, interrupting an informal cease-fire that had been in effect for over two years. In these inauspicious circumstances, I decided that the cease-fire should come into effect on 6 September as agreed, on the understanding that the transition period would begin as soon as the tasks referred to above had been completed. The Security Council supported my proposal that, during this delay, 100 military observers should be deployed to the Territory to verify the cease-fire and the cessation of hostilities in certain areas (S/23009). The number of military observers was subsequently increased to 200 and certain logistics and administrative support staff were also sent to the field. 3/

5. Since 6 September 1991, the headquarters of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) has been established in the capital, Laayoune, with three regional headquarters in the northern, central and southern sectors of the Territory. A liaison office has also been established in Tindouf with the assistance of the Government of Algeria. The 10 observation posts that the Council endorsed and that cover the main points of concern in the Territory are fully functional although some logistics and communications problems persist, mainly because of the inhospitable terrain and the climatic conditions.

6. There is no doubt that the United Nations military and civilian presence in the area has contributed significantly to a calming of the situation. No loss of life or property has been reported since the deployment of the observers. Both parties have, however, complained about violations of the cease-fire. One side has, for instance, drawn the attention of the United Nations to continual surveillance over-flights by military aircraft, while the other has complained about infiltration of troops into the Territory. In accordance with established practice, the complaints have been brought to the attention of those concerned. At the same time, I have personally urged both parties to refrain from any actions that could endanger the implementation of the plan. It is my earnest hope that restraint and serenity will prevail and that those concerned will, at all levels, honour their commitment to the settlement plan and the cause of peace.

7. It will be recalled that, in approving the settlement plan, the Security Council also accepted the timetable that I had proposed in my report of 19 April 1991. 4/ In paragraph 12 and elsewhere in that report, I indicated that the period of time allowed for the various processes were estimates that could require adjustment. Regrettably, slow progress in the accomplishment of certain tasks has already made it necessary to adjust the timetable.

8. This is largely due to the complexity of the identification process, whose purpose is to establish the list of those who would vote in the referendum. The parties have tended to interpret differently the relevant paragraphs of the plan in this regard. Despite a number of points of convergence between them, a satisfactory reconciliation of their positions has not yet been achieved. The cooperation of the parties was rightly identified in the plan as an essential condition for its successful implementation. This cooperation, while forthcoming in some areas, needs to be further strengthened in others if satisfactory progress is to be made.

9. Notwithstanding the difficulties encountered, progress has nevertheless been made in a number of areas. Most of the tasks that were to be completed before D-Day had been carried out and the necessary logistic provisions had been made by 6 September 1991. The exception lay in some parts of the identification process. The first stage of this process, consisting of the preparation by the United Nations of a revised list of the 1974 census, on the basis of information provided by the two parties, has been completed. It has not, however, proved possible to reach agreement on publication of this list in the Territory, which was to be the next stage in the process. Consultations on these matters with the parties, the tribal chiefs and others have since taken place. In my view, such consultations need to be intensified in the coming weeks with the support of the parties. Without the active assistance of the Western Saharans themselves, and notably their leaders, the United Nations cannot carry out the complex identification task in a timely and effective manner.

10. Meanwhile the general regulations governing the organization of the referendum have been promulgated and were made available to the President of the Security Council on 11 November 1991. The mandate of the Identification Commission and instructions relating to its tasks have also been finalized. These instructions are reproduced as annex I to this report. In my opinion these documents constitute a just and fair basis for the conduct of the referendum.

11. However, some differences of interpretation of the settlement plan still need to be addressed with the parties. These relate, inter alia, to the confinement of troops and the return of refugees and other Saharans living outside the Territory. While there is still time to address the former, I have personally taken up the latter question at the highest level. As is well known, a number of persons who are claimed to belong to Western Sahara have been moved into the Territory. I believe it is important that the utmost restraint be exercised at the present stage to ensure that the implementation of the settlement plan is not jeopardized by such actions. Anything that could endanger the indispensable climate of confidence should be avoided. It is clear, in any event, that only those persons who have been duly identified by the United Nations will eventually be eligible to vote in the referendum.

12. It has to be recognized, in the light of experience to date, that there is likely to be a further delay of some months while consultations continue with the parties on the above matters in order to establish the necessary conditions for implementation of the plan approved by the Security Council. The delay that has already occurred has obliged me, with great regret, to accept the resignation of my Special Representative, Mr. Johannes Manz, who is to assume his functions as his country's Permanent Observer to the United Nations, with effect from 1 January 1992.

13. During the months ahead every effort will be made to reduce costs. Those of the civilian staff working on MINURSO at Headquarters who are not required to support the consultations referred to above will be redeployed. The military elements of MINURSO that are already stationed in the Territory will

function as a military observer group, on normal United Nations lines, with the sole mandate of verifying the cease-fire and cessation of hostilities in the areas identified in my letter of 4 September 1991 to the President of the Security Council. 5/ Any personnel not required for this specific function will be returned to their national service. It may, however, be necessary to deploy some additional logistic personnel in order to ensure adequate living conditions for the military observers serving in the desert, which continues to cause me some concern.

14. I also intend to take this opportunity to clarify to the parties those acts which, in accordance with normal United Nations practice, are considered to be violations of the cease-fire and cessation of hostilities. Any persistent violations will be drawn to the attention of the Security Council.

15. I do not wish to sound unduly optimistic or leave the Council with the impression that the existing problems of interpretation and implementation are being underestimated by the United Nations. It is clear that, in the coming months, serious efforts will have to be made at the political and technical levels in order to keep the process going.

16. Finally, I wish to place on record my sincere gratitude to the members of the Security Council for the unfailing support and understanding that they have always afforded me in my efforts and from which I am certain my successor will benefit as the United Nations moves towards a just and definitive solution of the Western Sahara problem.

Notes

1/ S/21360.

2/ See S/22779.

3/ S/23044.

4/ S/22464.

5/ S/23008.

Annex

INSTRUCTIONS RELATING TO THE TASKS OF
THE IDENTIFICATION COMMISSION*

[Original: English and
French]

I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS

1. In conformity with paragraph 58 of document S/21360 and paragraph 9 of document S/22464, as well as chapter 3 of the general regulations issued by the Secretary-General on 8 November 1991, the following instructions regarding the process of identification of Saharans eligible to participate in the referendum are hereby enunciated.

2. It should be recalled that, according to the settlement plan, four essential conditions must be met to achieve the goal of holding a free, fair and impartial referendum for the Western Saharan population and to enable the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to carry out its responsibilities effectively and impartially: support and backing of the Security Council; full cooperation of the two parties; cooperation and support of the neighbouring countries; and the necessary financial resources. a/

II. PROVISIONS OF THE PLAN REGARDING IDENTIFICATION

3. Under the provisions of the plan, the Secretary-General is to set up, in consultation with the current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), an identification commission responsible for carefully and scrupulously reviewing the 1974 census and updating it. b/ The plan also provides that the role of the Identification Commission will be:

(a) To review carefully the census taken in the Territory in 1974 by the Spanish authorities and update it;

(b) To calculate the real growth of the Saharan population in the period between the date of the above census and the date of organization of the referendum, taking into account the following elements:

(i) births and deaths;

(ii) movements of the Saharan population. c/

* In accordance with chapter 3 of the general regulations promulgated by the Secretary-General on 8 November 1991. Further instructions relating to the tasks of the Commission, including its procedures and method of work, will be issued later, as required.

4. On the basis of the information mentioned above, the Identification Commission will establish as precisely as possible the number of Saharans living in the Territory of Western Sahara and the number of Saharan refugees and non-residents qualified to participate in the referendum. d/

5. In respect of the identification and registration of voters, the plan provides that, under the terms of the settlement proposals, the Identification Commission will implement the agreed position of the parties that all Western Saharans counted in the 1974 census undertaken by the Spanish authorities and aged 18 or over will have the right to vote, whether currently present in the Territory or outside as refugees or for other reasons. e/

6. In its resolution 658 (1990) of 27 June 1990, the Security Council, inter alia, requested the Secretary-General to transmit to the Security Council a further detailed report, on the understanding that the further report should be the basis on which the Security Council would authorize the establishment of MINURSO (see para. 5 of resolution 658 (1990)). In paragraph 2 of his report, the Secretary-General confirmed that he had addressed the main elements of the implementation plan and added details that might be of assistance to members of the Security Council in their consideration of the recommendation regarding the establishment of MINURSO.

7. In this context, document S/22464 provides that the Identification Commission's mandate to update the 1974 census will include (a) removing from the lists the names of persons who have since died and (b) considering applications from persons who claim the right to participate in the referendum on the grounds that they are Western Saharans and were omitted from the 1974 census. It is also provided that the United Nations will ask the tribal chiefs of Western Sahara to contribute to the Identification Commission's work. f/

8. As noted in paragraph 19 of the same document, the identification and registration of all Western Saharans eligible to vote in the referendum constitute a central element in the settlement proposals. They represent also one of the most difficult tasks, as was underlined by the United Nations Visiting Mission as early as 1975, when it observed that problems would arise in determining eligibility to participate in a referendum. g/

III. SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE SAHARAN SOCIETY

9. The difficulties of the identification process are due, in particular, to the characteristics of the Western Saharan population, notably its nomadic tradition and the tribal structure of the society. In that respect, the above-mentioned report observed: "because of their nomadic way of life, the people of the Territory move easily across the borders to the neighbouring countries, where they are received by members of their tribes or even of their families. This ebb and flow of people across the borders of the Territory makes it difficult to take a complete census of the inhabitants of Spanish Sahara and also poses the complex problem of the identification of the

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Saharans of the Territory and makes it even more difficult to take a satisfactory census of refugees." h/

10. The Saharan society remains for the most part a society structured around tribal membership, each tribe being subdivided in fractions, subfractions, and family groups (ahels). Some of these tribes extend beyond the borders of Western Sahara. Under the heading "status of an indigenous inhabitant", the 1975 report observed that "in view of the close affinity which exists between Saharans living within the Territory and those in neighbouring countries and also of their nomadic tradition, the question of determining who is and who is not an indigenous inhabitant of the Territory is a somewhat complex matter". i/ That complexity notwithstanding, it is clear that only members of tribes whose connection with the Territory within the limits of recognized international borders is clearly established should participate in the referendum.

11. To the difficulties related to the Saharan way of life and the structure of the society, one must add those resulting from conflicts that took place in the Territory over several decades, leading a large number of Saharans to seek refuge, at different times, in neighbouring countries. In addition, other Saharans indigenous to the Territory had to leave it for economic reasons, whether to migrate as a result of drought or to seek employment in neighbouring countries.

12. In view of the above, it is clear that a comprehensive count of indigenous Saharans, including those absent from the Territory, is a complex task. It should be recalled that, according to the Spanish authorities and the representatives of Saharan political movements met in 1975 by the United Nations visiting mission, any census of indigenous persons undertaken outside the Territory would have to be based on proven membership of social and family groups (fractions and subfractions of tribes) existing within the Territory. j/

IV. SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE 1974 CENSUS

13. Notwithstanding the difficulties noted above, the identification of the Saharan population living in Western Sahara was undertaken by the Spanish colonial administration. In particular, it carried out in 1974 a population census, which is referred to in the settlement plan. At the end of this census, the total count of Saharans living in the Territory was 73,497. In addition, as part of its identification effort, the colonial administration issued, between 1970 and 1976, a total of 32,516 national identity documents.

14. Those national identity documents, which were the basis for the census exercise, were issued by a permanent commission composed of tribal chiefs. The criteria for determining whether or not a Saharan was indigenous to the Territory was membership in a family group (ahel) which existed in the Territory. It was pointed out to the United Nations visiting mission that "all the members of such groups are known to each other and that the authenticity of a claim to belong to a family group can be verified by the sheiks and notables of that group in consultation with their members." k/

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15. It is recognized by the parties and the tribal chiefs that the 1974 census did not include all the Saharans from the Territory. On the one hand, a number of Saharans present in the Territory, whether or not they possessed a national identity document, were not contacted by the census teams, and, on the other hand, part of the population of the Territory lived, and still lives, outside Western Sahara, for a variety of reasons. It should be recalled that, in its final communiqué, the meeting of tribal chiefs organized by the United Nations in June 1990 recognized "the imperfections and inadequacies" of the 1974 census, and "among other things the fact that many Saharans and Saharan refugees were omitted".

16. In order to carry out the role entrusted to it, the Identification Commission must review the cases of Saharans indigenous to Western Sahara who, at the time of the census, either were present in the Territory but were not counted, or were absent from the Territory, notably for the reasons mentioned in paragraph 11 above. To ensure that all eligible Saharans are given an opportunity to participate in the referendum on the future status of the Territory, the Identification Commission must, with complete impartiality, make use of all resources and expertise at its disposal, particularly the tribal chiefs and notables.

V. ROLE OF THE TRIBAL CHIEFS AND NOTABLES

17. In view of the above-mentioned characteristics of the Saharan society, one can hardly overemphasize the crucial role of the cooperation and assistance of tribal chiefs and other notables of the Territory. Their contribution is indispensable at all stages of the identification process: to assist the Commission in refining its operational procedures; 1/ to assist in the review of the written applications from people who were not counted during the 1974 census; m/ and to assist in identifying and registering voters, and in connection with the process of appeals. n/

18. With their assistance, the Commission will review applications, taking into account relevant circumstances, in an impartial and just manner, with respect to all Saharans eligible to participate in the referendum.

VI. COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES

19. Such a complex exercise can succeed only with the cooperation of the parties in a spirit of objectivity and fairness. To carry out its task, the Commission must work in an atmosphere of trust and serenity which the parties must promote. Needless to say that without their cooperation, even the most vigorous efforts by the United Nations cannot enable it to fulfil its mission, whatever the human resources and financial means put at its disposal.

VII. INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE REVIEW OF APPLICATIONS FOR
PARTICIPATION IN THE REFERENDUM

20. Taking into account all the preceding considerations, these instructions have been developed for the guidance of the Identification Commission. They take into account recognized sources such as custom, international practice, generally recognized norms as well as laws in force in the region.

21. In applying them, the Commission will bear in mind, above all, that, for actual identification, it is the membership of a family group (subfraction of a tribe) existing within the Territory, which can be attested to by the sheiks and notables of the family group, that should eventually prevail for eligibility to participate in the referendum.

22. These guidelines apply to Saharans aged 18 years or more at the closing date for inclusion in the voters' list and are drawn directly from the provisions of the plan. f/ They must be applied by the Identification Commission, in the light of the preceding paragraph and of all available information and relevant circumstances. This can be achieved only with the assistance of tribal chiefs and the support of the parties.

23. It is understood that persons whose names are included in the revised 1974 census list are eligible to participate in the referendum. It is also understood that members of the immediate family (father, mother and children) of Saharans whose name is included in the original census list or in the revised census list will, owing to this close relationship, be allowed to participate in the referendum. The relationship will be established on the basis of an individual application.

24. With regard to other applications from people who claim the right to participate in the referendum on the ground that they are Saharans and were not counted during the 1974 census, the Commission must be mindful of several considerations stemming from a concern for justice and fairness.

25. It is understood that, upon presentation of an individual application, persons who lived in the Territory as members of a Saharan tribe at the time of the 1974 census and could not be counted are eligible to vote on the same ground as people who were counted. Testimonies or documents must be submitted in support of all individual applications.

26. In order to align the treatment granted to Saharans present but not counted at the time of the 1974 census to that of people whose name is on the census list, members of the immediate family of the former group (father, mother and children) are equally eligible to vote.

27. In respect of those members of a Saharan tribe indigenous to the Territory who, for the reasons mentioned in section IV above, were absent from Western Sahara at the time of the census, it is considered that their absence from the Territory at that time cannot justify that they be automatically deprived of their right to participate in the decision regarding the future of Western Sahara.

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28. It is necessary, however, that the link with the Territory of people absent in 1974 be solid and demonstrable. To develop guidelines in that respect, the United Nations has taken into account the concerns of the parties as well as the customs of the Saharan society. For instance, it should be recalled that in 1974 the yema'a, comprising Saharan traditional authorities, adopted norms for the issuance of identity documents to Saharans. ^{o/} To the extent appropriate, these norms were also taken into consideration.

29. Firstly, it is considered that an appropriate link to the Territory exists when the applicant was born of a Saharan father born in the Territory. In that regard, consideration was given to the fact that, in 1974, Saharan tribal chiefs themselves developed a liberal norm, patterned after their own tradition. It is also appropriate to note that one of the main tasks of the United Nations has been to promote decolonization around the world. In that context, people who fled colonial rule cannot be deprived of the right to decide on the future of the Territory to which they belong. Similarly, children, aged 18 years or more, should not be penalized just because their parents, owing to colonialism or other reasons mentioned above, chose or were obliged to leave their homes. However, in order not to widen excessively the scope of this provision, it has been restricted to one generation only.

30. Secondly, taking into account current provisions regulating the acquisition of nationality in the countries of the region, it is considered that a member of a Saharan tribe belonging to the Territory is eligible to participate in the referendum if he or she has resided in the Territory for a period of six consecutive years before 1 December 1974. That figure is not arbitrary: the period of six consecutive years represents the average period of residence required under the legal systems of the countries of the region as a condition for the acquisition of nationality.

31. Lastly, as an uninterrupted period of six years might penalize those Saharans who, owing to a variety of circumstances, have had to move frequently across the borders of the Territory, it was considered necessary to provide for a condition of an intermittent residence period of 12 years prior to 1 December 1974.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

32. The process of identification of people eligible to participate in the referendum will involve a number of proofs that applicants will have to provide in support of their claim. Official documents, well known to the Saharans and used by them, will help the Commission in making its assessment. In addition, the Commission will take into consideration the fact that in the Saharan society, oral testimonies play an important part in all social activities. Those testimonies, given under appropriate conditions, will also assist the Commission in judging the merits of individual applications.

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33. The United Nations is well aware that such a complex task as the identification of the Saharans cannot be accomplished hastily. In this regard, It is appropriate to recall the settlement plan, which states: "eligibility to vote will depend either on the presence of a person's name in the 1974 census list or on a person's ability to convince the Identification Commission that he or she is a Western Saharan who was omitted from the 1974 census. Matching individuals with names in a 17-year-old list is bound to take time. In a society that is nomadic and to a large extent illiterate and where such criteria as place of birth or residence are of limited relevance, the adjudication of applications from persons claiming to have been omitted from the 1974 list will also be time consuming. If the referendum is to be fair and impartial, in accordance with the settlement proposals, these processes cannot be rushed". p/

34. Furthermore, this process of identification can be carried out only with the complete cooperation of the parties, in a spirit of justice and objectivity. Without such cooperation and without equity and justice on the part of all concerned, particularly the tribal chiefs, the notables and the members of the ahels, the guidelines cannot, by themselves alone, enable the United Nations to fulfil in a satisfactory manner the task entrusted to it.

Notes

- a/ S/22464, para. 55.
- b/ S/21360, para. 25.
- c/ Ibid., para. 27.
- d/ Ibid., para. 28.
- e/ Ibid., para. 61.
- f/ S/22464, para. 20.
- g/ A/10023/Rev.1, annex, para. 157.
- h/ Ibid., para. 11.
- i/ Ibid., annex, para. 155.
- j/ Ibid., para. 125.
- k/ Ibid., para. 158.
- l/ S/22464, para. 20.
- m/ Ibid., para. 21.

Notes (continued)

n/ Ibid., para. 23.

o/ According to the first norm, shall be deemed Saharans "all persons born of Saharan father". See document A/10023/Rev.1, annex, para. 160.

p/ S/22464, op. cit., para. 62, subpara. (a).



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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON HIS MISSION
OF GOOD OFFICES IN CYPRUS

1. The present report on my mission of good offices concerning Cyprus is being submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 716 (1991) of 11 October 1991. In that resolution the Security Council endorsed my intention to resume discussions in early November with the two parties in Cyprus and Greece and Turkey to complete the set of ideas on an overall agreement and requested me to report to the Council in November 1991 whether sufficient progress had been made to convene the high-level international meeting and, should conditions not be ripe, to convey to the Council the set of ideas as they had evolved by that time with my assessment of the situation.
2. As a result of the parliamentary electoral process and the subsequent change of Government in Turkey, the discussions foreseen by the Council had to be postponed. Now that a new Government has been installed, I expect that this process will resume promptly in the new year.
3. My mission of good offices in general and my recent efforts in particular have been actively supported by the Security Council. Over the past two years, the Council has already been seized with the Cyprus question nine times. During this period it expressed its unanimous position in resolutions 649 (1990) and 716 (1991) and in seven presidential statements. Taken together, these resolutions and statements provide a clear basis for completing the work on an overall framework agreement and give clear guidance to the Secretary-General on how to proceed.
4. As I stated in my most recent report to the Council, 1/ the discussions that took place in August had raised justifiable expectations that significant progress would be made and that a high-level international meeting would take place in September 1991 to conclude an overall agreement. Regrettably, as the Council is aware, this did not prove possible. Nevertheless, progress was made in preparing a set of ideas for an overall framework agreement.
5. The set of ideas that evolved from these talks represent an important step forward for arriving at an overall agreement on Cyprus. On a significant

number of issues, the ideas should make it possible for the two sides to reach agreement. The framework of a settlement has become clear.

6. The agreement will result in the establishment of a bicomunal and bizonal federation, one State comprising two politically equal communities in which sovereignty will be equally shared but indivisible, that will safeguard the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of Cyprus and exclude union in whole or in part with any other country and any form of partition or secession. The federation will be established through a new constitutional arrangement that will be prepared in line with the overall framework agreement being negotiated in which the two communities participate on an equal footing and that will be approved through separate referendums in each community.

7. In the federal republic to be established, the relations of the two communities will be regulated on the basis of political equality. It has been agreed that

"While political equality does not mean equal numerical participation in all federal government branches and administration, it should be reflected inter alia in various ways: in the requirement that the federal constitution of the State of Cyprus be approved or amended with the concurrence of both communities; in the effective participation of both communities in all organs and decisions of the federal Government; in safeguards to ensure that the federal Government will not be empowered to adopt any measures against the interests of one community; and in the equality and identical powers and functions of the two federated States." 2/

8. Furthermore, the set of ideas should make it possible for the two sides to agree on the powers and functions to be vested in the federal Government as well as on the federal government structure. Elements are now available for defining the modus operandi of the federal legislature and judiciary branches and even for the executive, which remains one of the areas where more work is required to overcome the differences.

9. The consideration of the crucial issue of security and guarantee is well advanced. Both sides agree that the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance remain in force and will be supplemented in an agreed manner. The security and guarantee provisions in the set of ideas provide for the withdrawal of all non-Cypriot forces not foreseen in the Treaty of Alliance and arrangements to ensure the security of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities.

10. The set of ideas contain useful elements for resolving the issues of territorial adjustments and displaced persons. However, the positions of the two sides remain apart. As I stressed in my report of 8 October 1991, 1/ I remain convinced that, if it is possible to move forward on these two headings, an agreed overall framework agreement will be within reach.

11. Finally, for the first time, useful ideas have been set out on the transitional arrangements to implement the overall framework agreement, including to prepare and put into force the federal constitution, and on a programme of action to promote goodwill and closer relations between the two communities that would be implemented as soon as the overall framework agreement has been approved by the two communities in separate referendums.

Observations

12. As I am about to conclude my functions as Secretary-General, I cannot hide my disappointment that the Cyprus question, with which I have been personally involved since 1975, has not been resolved and that the shadow of uncertainty and insecurity continues to hang over the island. At the same time, I remain encouraged by the conviction that the two communities will inevitably recognize that a mutually acceptable solution is in their respective self-interest. I am also heartened by the fact that the Security Council, despite the passage of time, remains determined that a just and lasting solution should be achieved in Cyprus. There is indeed ample proof that the status quo in Cyprus is not an option and that the disturbing current situation must be solved.

13. The expectations raised earlier this year that a high-level international meeting would take place to conclude an overall framework agreement must not be lost. It is vital that the set of ideas that emerged from the talks that my representatives had in Ankara in August 1991 be preserved and completed in preparation for such a meeting.

14. The mission entrusted to the Secretary-General by the Security Council is firmly centred on the future. Continued recriminations about the past or the present will not help this effort. It is important that both sides focus their attention on the establishment of a federal republic and bring to this effort the necessary flexibility and realism. A solution is within reach if all concerned are willing to make their contribution to a compromise solution that will safeguard the legitimate interests and concerns of both communities. I call on the leaders of the two communities and of Greece and Turkey to devote their full energies to this task so that the long overdue solution can be reached and the two communities can together live in Cyprus in harmony, security and prosperity.

Notes

1/ S/23121.

2/ S/21183, annex I, para. 11.
